The term Systems of Systems (SoS) has recently been introduced in the systems engineering domain to describe a new class of systems exhibiting a number of attributes such as complexity, autonomy, and geographic dispersion. The (UK) Ministry of Defence Architectural Framework (MODAF) is a prominent framework used in the defence domain. MODAF is organised in views, each of which focuses on a single aspect of the system operation. Although MODAF addresses a variety of aspects, it does not offer a view defined to provide safety related information. The paper presents the concept of failure maps (F-maps) and how they can be integrated with other MODAF views, and used during safety analysis of a SoS. Failure maps (F-maps) are failure-oriented, deviation-based maps, identifying how dependability failures of SoS elements are associated, impacting the overall SoS operation.
Introduction
During SoS evolution, developers can find themselves addressing a number of different aspects of the SoS operation. These include composition of SoS capabilities out of SoS element functions, collaboration of elements, and design of SoS infrastructure. Figure 1 illustrates an example of a SoS (following the Network Enabled Capability paradigm), in which a command centre, artillery, troops and unmanned aerial vehicles collaborate to suppress guerrilla activity (AGO scenario). Developing such systems involves complex design decisions. Developers use a wide spectrum of information in order to make such decisions, the amount of which makes it difficult to be managed. For this reason a number of architectural frameworks have been introduced, aggregating information in views, concerned with a particular aspect of system operation. The (UK) Ministry of Defence Architectural Framework (MODAF) is a prominent framework used in the (UK) defence domain [9] . Similarly to other similar architectural frameworks (such as the USA equivalent -DODAF), MODAF is organised in views. Each view focuses on a single aspect of the system operation, such as (not in MODAF terminology) activities, nodes, and functionality views. Although MODAF addresses a variety of aspects it does not offer a view encompassing safety related information. SoS are complex systems, almost always involving interaction with humans. Safety is a very important attribute in both the civil and defence domain. Developing a safe system involves a process of identifying the potential hazardous behaviour of the system, eliciting requirements that will ensure its safe operation. Wilson et al [11] provided an example of associating safety concepts, demonstrating benefits from documenting safety information. Designing a system in context of safety, can have ramifications on the design decisions of the SoS and involves well-informed decisions, resulting in an overall acceptable system. A safety view will provide information about the contribution of each SoS component to overall system safety.
Safety Requirements Elicitation
The operation of a System of Systems consists of the combined operation of each of its constituent elements. Identification of requirements with regard to the operation of a System of Systems occurs by considering the envisioned operation of the SoS. Initially the high level safety requirements of the system are identified. Then as development the system design process needs to consider apportionment of the overall SoS requirements to individual elements of the system. Decomposition of requirements is common in safety. For example, the Airborne Recommended Practice (ARP) 4761 [6] follows this paradigm. During the latest stages of design evolution the analysts have more data about the system as well as more detailed data. This is reflected on the type of analysis that is employed during the safety lifecycle stages. During early stages the employed methods aim to explore the design for safety implications and identify requirements; whereas in later lifecycle stages the focus is on confirming the successful implementation of requirements.
Apportionment and thereafter traceability of safety requirements is very important. The operation of each individual SoS elements cannot be interpreted with respect to safety, without tracing the requirements from lower level requirements to SoS level safety requirements. This need is further exacerbated by a shift to goal-based approach to safety (in contrast to previously dominating prescriptive approaches), with UK MoD Def Stan 00-56 being a representative standard. Goal based standards follow a hazard oriented philosophy, according to which developers need to demonstrate (with sufficient assurance) the operation of the system's constituent components will result non hazardous system operation.
Depending on how the SoS elements collaborate, failures can propagate and manifest themselves as different types (of failure) in different elements of the system [5] . For example, a reliability failure at the network level (e.g. loss of a relay) may result in performance bottlenecks at element level and unavailability of capability at the SoS level. Additionally, achieving the required behaviour in order for a hazard to be mitigated is not always straightforward, as there are conflicts between system attributes that will inevitably result in tradeoffs. Due to conflicts between SoS attributes, it is inevitable that not all SoS requirements will be satisfied as originally expected. SoS developers need to understand the relationship between these attributes and make an informed decision as to the most appropriate and in the same time most optimal design.
Dependability Deviation Analysis (DDA)
Dependability Deviation Analysis (DDA) is a methodical, exploratory, deviation based system analysis approach. Its purpose is to elicit multi-attribute (dependability) goal-based requirements, by being applied throughout the stages of the system lifecycle. Deviation based techniques have been applied extensively to safety and are considered very successful during analysis of the system. Deviation analyses probe the design of a system, by prompting a design element with a guideword (e.g. more, less, late, no, omission) indicating a deviation from intended behaviour (e.g. omission of service X). If the effects of the deviation affect the operation of the system with respect to the viewpoint of interest to the stakeholders (i.e. for safety, analysts will focus on deviations with effect significant for safety), a potential (failure) condition is identified. Following identification of a significant (to the attribute of interest to the stakeholders) condition, a requirement is stated that would prevent the identified deviation or mitigate the consequent (failure) condition. A (failure) condition that occurs during the operation of the system may impact on the achievement of a dependability attribute, which in its turn may have an impact on other attributes or result in unacceptable system operation. There are two underlying principles of DDA: commonality of dependability attributes, and extensibility of deviation guidewords. Dependability attributes bare similarities with each other. This has been identified and has been work to generalise and unify dependability attributes, although not to the extent of covering dependability entirely. Most common are attempts to establish a common framework addressing both safety and security [7] [3] . DDA encompasses the dependability attributes, by generalising on some of their common concepts. Comparing the guidewords of existing deviation analysis methods with dependability, we can observe that the guidewords represent a set of issues from the viewpoint of different dependability attributes. For example guideword NO (used in HAZOPS [4] ) could be seen as representing an availability issue. Deviation analyses [4] , [10] , methods use a set of guidewords that is considered to satisfactorily reveal potential failure conditions, for the type of systems for which they (deviation analysis methods) are used [10] . Guidewords used in DDA extend the typical guidewords found in HAZOPS and SHARD so that combined with appropriate system models can result in deviations that can reveal potential (failure) conditions significant to all dependability attributes. At the end of the DDA process, stakeholders will have identified and understood how deviation of the system with regard to a dependability attribute, will result in a credible failure condition.
Definition of DDA is based on two pylons: specification and interrelationships of concepts and the process using these concepts. In order to provide a clear and rigorous description of the specification, a metamodel has been created, capturing the concepts, their attributes, their legitimate associations as well as constraints that need to be applied when instantiating the DDA concepts. The process describes the steps that need to be taken and the order in which the concepts collaborate in order to create the instance of DDA. DDA is one of the (sub) metamodels constituting the Dependability Case Metamodel (DCM) [1] .
Failure Maps (F-maps)
An F-map is a visualisation of the effects chain between the identified failure conditions, shown in Figure 4 . It depicts the system elements, the guidewords with which were prompted, and the identified credible failure conditions. Considering the effects of each failure condition, associations between failure conditions are recorded. Based on the identified set of failure conditions, stakeholders specify (as previously described) requirements about the envisioned operation of the system, in the case of DDA focusing on specification regarding the dependable operation of a system rather than requirements about the mitigation of potential failure conditions (which can take place within the argument). Moreover, by having a complete picture of the associations between failure conditions, the respective requirements can be stated in the context of how they will ultimately affect the entire operation of the SoS, and not in (the local) context of a single failure condition. Colour (or shades) in the F-map can allow presentation of additional information. In the example of Figure 3 colour indicates the number of effect links of a failure condition (not all links are shown in Figure 3 ). The dashed line between Hazard and DependabilityAttribute denotes the existence of more classes between the two, which however are outside of the scope of F-maps (and are part of DDA which provides a broader modelling of dependability attributes). The identified Guidewords prompt the SystemElements for potential deviations. When a Deviation is considered to be credible (for the system) and may result in unwanted behaviour, a FailureCondition is defined. Following identification of unwanted behaviour a DerivedRequirement is specified preventing it, similar to common practice in safety. DerivedRequirements are associated with DependabilityAttributes. This allows explicit identification of the (system) perspective from which a requirement was specified. DerivedRequirements are then collated in a Profile for each SystemElement. Thus it contains all the requirements necessary to avoid (known) unwanted behaviour.
Failure-oriented.
The core concept of F-maps is the FailureCondition, identified during dependability deviation analysis (DDA). Fmaps depict a chain of effects (of failures) showing how they affect the operation of particular SoS elements, but also the higher SoS objectives. This can be particularly useful establishing a hazard-oriented view which will then provide the context for certification following product based standards (Def Stan 00-56). Moreover by capturing all the effect links of failure conditions, analysts can examine the effect of a combination of failures. For example, an erroneous value propagated to another SoS element, combined with another failure. This type of failures is one of the major challenges in SoS analyses [5] .
Interrelation and (safety) contribution of dependability attributes.
Failures depicted in F-maps are created during DDA, during which deviant behaviour of the system is examined. During deviation analysis the system is probed with deviations from the perspective of many dependability attributes (e.g. late; performance, corrupt; reliability). Credible deviations result in failures that can potentially affect the operation of the system. F-maps explicitly identify the perspective from which a failure has been identified. This allows analysts to filter failures depending on their attribute of interest. By associating failures (that are depicted in f-maps), analysts explicitly identify how dependability attributes affect each other (for example a performance failure resulting in a safety failure). F-maps allow the explicit documentation of how different aspects of the SoS operation can affect safety, and understanding the transformation of failure conditions as they propagate through the SoS elements.
Elicitation and documentation of requirements.
Identification of failures and their relation to dependability attributes enables analysts to elicit requirements, explicitly associated with various dependability perspectives. For example, a failure associated with a performance deviation (e.g. a message received late) will result in a requirement about the performance of that particular message (e.g. respond within 10ms). One challenge in a SoS is apportionment of requirements. SoS are dynamic systems and their elements are not designed with a particular SoS operational context. Hence, identifying whether a SoS element, matches the requirements elicited by SoS analysts. F-maps allow capturing safety derived requirements as operational profiles associated with individual SoS elements. This enables safety analysts, during the safety assurance process, to examine the available evidence for each requirement and identify the need for further evidence or further safety architectural mechanisms.
Model -Driven Integration with MODAF
Definition of MODAF views and concepts is specified in the MODAF metamodel (M3) [9] . Similarly to Figure 4 , M3 contains all the concepts necessary to define the different views and establish traceability. Instantiating the metamodel results in the models that capture specific SoS. Figure 1 ov2ov5 illustrates an example of OV2 and OV5 for the AGO (SoS) scenario. Traceability between views is established with the item FlightPathData (which may not be necessarily depicted in OV5). Having established this kind of traceability, we are able to identify how the effects of a needline failure may affect the transmitted data and thus the calculation of the flight path, which eventually will endanger the SoS element (in this case the UAV). Similar failures are shown in the Fmap of Figure 3 (needline 7) . Creating a view that can be used in the development of system modelled using MODAF, will have to be integrated with the existing metamodel.
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Figure 5 -OV2 and OV5 of the AGO scenario
As already described, F-maps have been developed in a model driven approach using a metamodel. This allows to explicitly associate F-map concepts (e.g. SoS elements) with equivalent elements in the MODAF metamodel, thus establishing traceability between the two. Figure 6 shows how F-maps are associated with MODAF. The interface between an F-map and MODAF is the SystemElement, representing any part of the system which corresponds to the super class of all MODAFElements. This can include constructs depicted in the MODAF models, such as Nodes, Needlines, InformationExchanges, and OperationalActivities. When probing the system, guidewords are paired with MODAF elements. Identifying whether a guideword can result in a credible failure condition involves examination of the model. In the case of Figure 5 , it can be seen in Figure 6 that Nodes are connected with each other through needlines, which are composed of information exchanges. Information exchanges provide and receive data to and from operational activities. There can be cases when the models do not depict explicit traceability information. The underlying metamodel allows to systematically establish traceability between the system's components and their respectively defined failure conditions. Moreover, use of a metamodel allows automated (or human supervised) methods of impact analysis. This is particularly useful in such systems, as their size and complexity often make manual analysis difficult and inconsistent.
Extensions and Annotations.
A significant benefit from establishing a metamodel to define the concepts of a domain is extensibility. F-maps can be annotated and extended with additional and related concepts. Annotations focus on modelling additional information on an existing model. Extensions provide additional concepts either by the specification of additional concepts or by interfacing and integrating with another method.
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Derived Requirement Figure 7 -Concepts can be extended or annotated. Figure 7 illustrates an example of extending existing concepts. In this case the concept of risk was added to the Fmap, associated with the failure conditions, and the concept of stakeholders owning requirements. This can allow integration of other analysis methods enriching the information captured by the F-maps. One such example of integration is described in [2] , in which F-maps provide the basis for integrating manual (using DDA), with automated simulation based SoS analysis. In this example, F-maps are annotated with the SoS deviation behaviour properties, which are then fen into the simulator using a defined interface. Following the completion of the simulation run the results are fed back to the F-map (potentially) adding information that was not identified during manual (DDA) analysis. This may an often occasion in SoS as due to their complexity, it is difficult for manual (human) analysis to identify the most complex failures. Similarly to the example if integrating F-maps with simulation, F-maps can easily be extended and interfaced with other methods, providing an integrated safety view.
The Role of F-maps in Safety Assurance
By the end of the SoS safety lifecycle developers aim to have acquired sufficient confidence about the safety of the SoS. Moreover, where the requirement exists, developers should create a safety case, which will communicate this assurance. This is achieved by explicitly presenting the reasoning behind the developers' position that the system is safe, referencing all the necessary information (evidence) supporting it.
As described it is inevitable in safety analysis that the top level SoS safety goals will be associated with the operation of the individual SoS elements. F-maps document the SoS elements, the operation of which is implicated in the overall SoS safety. Figure 9 shows how this can be used to reason about the overall SoS safety (that will be captured in a safety case). Figure 9 -F-maps capture the safety implication of each system element A top level argument documents the reasoning behind the overall SoS safety goals. Developers need to specify SoS operation, identify the potential hazards that can lead to accidents, and define the acceptable levels of risk. Subsequently, developers need to establish that SoS safety will not be compromised by the operation of the SoS elements with the potential to do so. This can be translated in the SoS satisfying the (safety) requirements that were derived during safety analysis. F-maps document the SoS elements that can affect safety. In the same time, they record the requirements derived from all failure conditions identified for a SoS element. This can be instrumental in structuring a safety argument for the SoS, identifying safety critical behaviour. Arguments can be targeted to assure adherence to the derived profile documented in failure maps. Naturally, this may not be the only argument structuring strategy. Moreover completeness of the profile requirements depends on the coverage of the deviations used during DDA. Integrating Fmaps with other analysis methods will result in more confidence about the completeness of a SoS element profile.
Creation of a safety case, documenting the system argument is often a requirement, particularly in the UK where it is a legal requirement. It is common for safety cases to be accompanied by a graphically represented argument, using argumentation methods such as the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN), and Claims Argument Evidence (CAE). The F-maps model has been integrated with GSN as part of the Dependability Case Metamodel (DCM), resulting in their seamless application during safety lifecycle. Common practice has shown that a safety case should be developed in parallel to the system. Also there is interaction between the safety case argument and system development. The former assesses the fitness of the design to support the required safety claims, whereas the latter indicates the realism of the developers' position captured in the argument.
F-maps can provide good traceability between artefacts of the safety argument and system design. Failure conditions are associated with GSN goals, claiming the prevention or mitigation of the former. F-maps allow the decomposition of such claims to claims about concrete requirements, based on profile requirements. All argument goals can be related to a system element via the F-maps metamodel, explicitly identifying the design (contextual) information relevant to the argument.
Summary
This paper presented the concept of failure maps (F-maps), being used as an architectural view, integrating a number of pertinent concepts to safety analysis. F-maps offer a number of benefits to the analysis of a SoS:
-Failure oriented explicitly modelling the associations between different types of failures of the SoS elements. -Identification and interrelation of dependability attributes. -Elicitation and documentation of safety requirements in operational profiles. -Provision of contextual information to a (SoS) safety case in an organised easily accessible view. -Model-based unambiguous integration with other (MODAF) views, allowing for automated model management functions such as traceability.
To date, use of F-maps has already shown promising results in terms of providing a useful SoS view. Existing implementation uses a certain amount of manual input, and further work focuses on creating a fully integrated view supporting more degree of automation.
